Framing Effects and the Selection of IS Design Alternatives by Fish, Michael R.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 1996 Proceedings Americas Conference on Information Systems(AMCIS)
8-16-1996
Framing Effects and the Selection of IS Design
Alternatives
Michael R. Fish
Stern School of Business, New York University, mfish@stern.nyu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1996
This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 1996 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Fish, Michael R., "Framing Effects and the Selection of IS Design Alternatives" (1996). AMCIS 1996 Proceedings. 144.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis1996/144
Framing Effects and the Selection of IS Design Alternatives  
Michael R. Fish 
Stern School of Business - New York University 
email: mfish@stern.nyu.edu 
Introduction 
Studies focusing on designer cognition constitute a well-developed 
stream of research in the field of information systems (IS). This line 
of research has yielded valuable insights into the cognitive mechanisms 
used by IS designers to elicit requirements, decompose and restructure 
problems, and formulate and evaluate potential designs (Malhotra et. 
al., 1980; Jeffries et. al., 1980; Turner, 1983; Vitalari and Dickson, 
1983). One area that has received relatively little attention within 
this stream of research is the cognitive bias displayed by IS designers 
when making judgments under uncertainty (Stacy and Macmillian, 1995). 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the framing of 
design alternatives systematically biases the risk preferences of IS 
designers. 
Research Problem 
Theoretical Frameworks for Decision-Making Under Uncertainty 
A frequently studied topic in decision theory is the manner in which an individual decision-maker accounts 
for uncertain outcomes (Coombs et. al., 1970; Watson and Buede, 1987). One of the most prominent 
theories for decision-making under risk is the expected utility model (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 
1947; Savage, 1954). This normative model is based on the assumption that a decision-maker can specify a 
utility function based on a consistent, well-ordered set of preferences for decision outcomes. When making 
decisions under uncertainty, a rational decision-maker will select the alternative that offers the highest 
expected utility.  
One utility function that is of particular interest in many decision-making situations is an individual's 
utility-of-wealth function. The widely embraced decreasing marginal utility hypothesis contends that most 
individuals exhibit a concave utility-of-wealth function. The essence of this hypothesis is that the concave 
shape of the utility function leads an individual to refuse all fair gambles. Thus, the individual will exhibit 
an aversion to risk for decisions made under uncertainty. 
A number of researchers have questioned the tenability of expected utility theory as the foundation for a 
descriptive theory of decision-making under risk. Tversky and Kahneman (1979, 1981) have proposed an 
alternative model of decision-making under uncertainty which they have termed "prospect theory". 
Prospect theory can be viewed as a modification of expected utility theory in which the utility function for 
decision outcomes is replaced by a value function. A typical individual's value function for wealth is 
defined relative to a neutral reference point, such as the individual's current asset position (Thaler, 1980). 
Positive deviations from the reference position are termed gains, and negative deviations are termed losses. 
The value function for gains is concave and relatively flat, whereas the value function for losses is convex 
and relatively steep. As a result, individuals will tend to be moderately risk averse when faced with a gain, 
and strongly risk seeking when faced with a loss. Note that prospect theory's prediction of risk preference 
directly contradicts the decreasing marginal utility hypothesis. 
The Selection of Information Systems Design Alternatives  
In IS development projects, the relationship between clients and designers can be characterized as a 
principal-agent relationship. An agency theory perspective would suggest that designers' decisions are 
motivated by their own self-interests rather than by the interests of their clients (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991). For example, designers may be more concerned with building an 
empire or experimenting with new technology than with selecting the most cost-effective design solution 
for their clients. 
To protect against this contingency, clients may impose such administrative controls as performance-based 
compensation plans for designers or competitive bidding practices for IS development projects (Kambil and 
Turner, 1993; Cash et. al., 1992). Ostensibly, the purpose of these controls is to encourage designers' to 
pursue design solutions that are aligned with the clients' objectives. However, these controls may also affect 
the risk preferences of designers in subtle, unintended ways. More specifically, these controls may frame 
circumstances surrounding a development project as gains or losses, thereby systematically biasing 
designers' risk preferences as suggested by prospect theory. This argument suggests two hypotheses that are 
investigated in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: When administrative controls frame project circumstances as gains, IS designers will 
moderately prefer risk-averse design alternatives. When administrative controls frame project 
circumstances as losses, IS designers will strongly prefer risk-seeking design alternatives. 
Hypothesis 2: When a bidding event for IS development is framed as an opportunity for gain, designers 
will submit bids that exceed expected development cost. When a bidding event for IS development is 
framed as a threatened loss, designers will submit bids that are less than expected development cost.  
Research Method and Results 
The subjects in this study are systems engineers employed by a software development company in the 
northeastern United States. In November 1993, study questionnaires were mailed to seventy-eight systems 
engineers in the company. Responses were obtained from forty-three engineers, yielding a fifty-five percent 
response rate. 
The questionnaire focused on the framing effects resulting from two administrative controls: performance-
based compensation plans for IS designers, and competitive bidding practices for IS development projects. 
Two hypothetical IS design cases were created for each administrative control, one framed as an 
opportunity for gain and the other framed as a threatened loss. The four resulting cases are summarized in 
Table 1. 
In each of these four cases, the subject was asked to choose between two design alternatives with equal 
expected values for development cost and time. One alternative had certain outcomes (e.g., certain cost, 
certain development time), and the other alternative had risky outcomes. In cases 3 and 4, the subjects were 
also told that they were members of an organization's IS department, and they were asked to bid on a 
development project requested by another department. The subjects were told that they were competing 
against external vendors, and that a linear relationship existed between the bid price and the probability of 
winning the bid. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of an analysis of the selection of design alternatives using logistic 
regression. In accordance with hypothesis 1, the subjects strongly preferred risky alternatives when faced 
with losses and moderately preferred non-risky alternatives when faced with gains. This decision-making 
tendency was independent of the type of administrative control used to create the framing, and of the 
designer's experience level.  
Table 3 summarizes the analysis of results for the bids. Case 3 was constructed such that the subject was 
assured of a gain if he or she should so choose. As shown in Table 3, the subjects' average bid price was 
significantly higher than expected cost, but still provided an eight-five percent chance of winning the bid. 
These results support hypothesis 2. 
In contrast, case 4 was framed as a loss. If the designer were to lose the bid in this case, layoffs would 
occur in the IS department. Thus, the designer had an incentive to submit a low bid. However, a bid which 
was too low would not cover the expected cost of development, and the IS department would have to draw 
on slack organizational resources to cover the cost deficit. Note that the subjects could have submitted a bid 
price equal to expected cost and still have had a sixty percent chance of winning. Instead, the threat of 
layoffs compelled the subjects to submit an average bid price that was significantly lower than expected 
cost in order to improve their chance of winning the bid to seventy-eight percent. These results also support 
hypothesis 2. 
Discussion and Implications 
Organizations are becoming increasingly aware of the need to manage both the costs and risks associated 
with IS development projects. In response to this need, researchers have proposed numerous administrative 
controls (Kambil and Turner, 1993; Cash et. al., 1992). However, previous research has not articulated the 
possible decision framing consequences that may arise from these controls. Perhaps this is because decision 
framing is a subtle and largely unnoticed phenomenon (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). To successfully 
manage development risks, however, organizations need to understand how their administrative controls 
can lead to framing effects which systematically influence the risk preferences of IS designers. 
References available upon request from the author..  
TYPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL  
TYPE OF FRAMING COMPENSATION PLAN FOR IS DESIGNERS  
COMPETITIVE BIDDING 
PRACTICE 
GAIN 
CASE 1 - receive a bonus for 
exceeding IS design 
objectives  
CASE 3 - opportunity for IS 
department to win the bid for 
a profitable project  
LOSS 
CASE 2 - forfeit a portion of 
compensation for failing to 
meet IS design objectives  
CASE 4 - layoffs are 
threatened if IS department 
loses bid for a non-profitable 
project  
Table 1 - Summary of Cases Used in Questionnaire 
ESTIMATES FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL  
PREDICTOR VARIABLES  PARAMETER ESTIMATES*  STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE  
CONSTANT b0 = 1.1761**  0.3703 
FRAME b1 = -1.2635***  0.3436 
CONTROL b2 = 0.0237  0.4028 
EXPERIENCE b3 = -0.0062  0.0189 
*df = 239; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001  
TYPE OF FRAMING ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF SELECTING RISKY DESIGN  . 
GAIN 0.46  . 
LOSS 0.74  . 
Table 2 - Analysis of the Selection of Design Alternatives  
TYPE OF FRAMING  
. GAIN (CASE 3)*  LOSS (CASE 4)**  
EXPECTED COST OF DESIGN 
ALTERNATIVES  $ 450,000 $ 1,700,000  
MEAN OF BID PRICE  $ 536,800 $ 1,608,000  
STANDARD DEVIATION OF BID PRICE  $ 51,400 $ 141,300  
TEST OF BID PRICE VS. EXPECTED COST  PRICE > COST***  PRICE < COST***  
MEAN CHANCE OF WINNING BID  0.85 0.78  
% OF RESPONDENTS SELECTING RISKY 
DESIGN ALTERNATIVE  0.51 0.67  
*n = 39; **n = 40; ***p < 0.001  
Table 3 - Summary of Bid Results 
 
